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Abstract 
 
Reincarnation of the Good Neighbor:  
Nixon and the Creation of Latin American Policy 
 
James Ralph Martin, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Jeremi Suri 
 
Much of the research on President Richard Nixon and his Latin American policy 
offers an overly simplistic portrayal of his attitudes and polices toward Latin America. 
This report explores the creation of President Richard Nixon’s Latin American policy in 
the first year of his administration. After a brief overview of key events early in the 
administration, such as the U.S. government’s response to the brief war between El 
Salvador and Honduras known colloquially as the “Soccer War”, the body of the report 
will explore two discrete events. The first event was the ill-fated Operation Intercept, an 
attempt by the Nixon administration to stem the flow of marijuana across the Mexican 
border. Operation Intercept, the largest peacetime search and seizure operation in U.S. 
history up to that point, highlighted many of the sources of friction between U.S. 
government agencies. Additionally, the operation provides an example of the growing 
importance of the NSC in government decision making and the ability of the Nixon 
administration to learn from past mistakes. This incident also provides an example of the 
 vii 
agency of the Mexican government, the other half of the foreign policy equation. The 
other event this report will highlight is Nixon’s one major speech on Latin America, 
which he gave on October 31, 1969. This speech was the culmination of almost a year’s 
worth of events, meetings, and reports that morphed into the White House’s strategic 
vision toward the region. This report concludes with a comparison of Nixon and Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s Latin American policies. Both president’s approaches were 
remarkably similar in substance including an increased focus on hemispheric trade and 
close relations with unsavory dictators that advanced U.S. interests. The differences in 
policy outcomes were ultimately due to changing cultures in both the United States and 
Latin America, but also to fundamental differences in how both men approached the 
presidency. 
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 1 
Introduction 
“Understandably, perhaps, a feeling has arisen in many Latin American countries 
that the United States really ‘no longer cares.’ Well, my answer to that tonight is 
very simple. We do care. I care.” 
-Richard Nixon 1969 
 
On January 20, 1969, Richard M. Nixon recited the Oath of Office on two family 
bibles held open to Isaiah 2:4
1
, “nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall 
they learn war anymore,”1 becoming the 37th president of the United States. The 
symbolism was unmistakable. Nixon wanted to portray himself as a peacemaker. In his 
sweeping inaugural address, Nixon communicated a grand vision to “make the world safe 
for mankind.” However, at no point in his address did he mention any particular country 
or region. The Latin American
2
 diplomatic community took note of this silence since 
every inaugural address since Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) contained a reference to 
hemispheric relations, and worried about what his silence meant.
3
 Roosevelt’s first 
inaugural address, however, failed to reference Latin America specifically. The one line 
on foreign policy was purposely vague dedicating “this nation to the policy of the good 
neighbor.” Only later in his administration did the term “good neighbor” become 
                                                 
1
Full verse: “And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their 
swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, 
neither shall they learn war anymore.” 
2 This master’s report uses the terms Latin America, Western Hemisphere, and Central and South America 
mostly interchangeably. Occasionally Western Hemisphere includes Canada and or the Caribbean Islands. 
Such usage will be noted in the text 
3
 Richard J. Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign 
Relations in a Turbulent Era (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010), 170. 
 2 
associated with hemispheric policy.
4
 The anxiety among the diplomats was that Latin 
American concerns would not be a priority under the new president. 
The perception among many historians has been that the trajectory of U.S.-Latin 
American relations has been one of general decline since President Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy in the 1930s and 1940s.5 This is not to say there were not moments of 
increased engagement. President John F. Kennedy launched an “Alliance for Progress” 
which provided aid to Latin American countries in an effort to thwart Communism. 
Previously, President Dwight D. Eisenhower increasingly focused on the region after the 
ill-fated visit of then Vice President Richard Nixon to South America in 1958. For the 
most part, however, U.S.-Latin American relations, outside of Cuba, took a back seat to 
other U.S. priorities.  
When analyzing Nixon’s Latin American policy, historians have generally viewed 
the administration as continuing the downward trend in relations.6 Scholars have latched 
onto some of Nixon’s and his chief foreign policy expert, National Security Advisor 
(NSA) Henry Kissinger’s more dismissive comments when analyzing Nixon’s 
hemispheric policy. For instance, Kissinger, after listening to the Chilean foreign minister 
lecture on the United States’ general abuse of power in the hemisphere, told the minister 
                                                 
4 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, 1 edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 497. 
5 For example see Stephen G Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United 
States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, Reprint edition (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007). 
6 For example see  Jeffrey F Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin 
America (New York: Routledge, 2007), 185.; Richard J. Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: 
How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 2010), 169. 
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over lunch, “nothing important can come from the South. History has never been 
produced in the South.”7 Nixon, while giving career advice to the Director of the Office 
of Economic Opportunity Donald Rumsfeld also offered his opinion, “people don’t give a 
damn about Latin America.” He then continued, “The only thing that matters is Japan, 
China, Russia, and Europe.”8 One scholar even went as far as stating, “Nixon voiced 
contempt about all things Latin American.”9 Nixon in his first year in office, however, 
was more concerned about Latin America than the dismissive comments suggest. In an 
attempt to rejuvenate the state of U.S-Latin American relations, Nixon unconsciously 
modeled his policies on FDR’s Good Neighbor approach. While Nixon himself would 
never admit to recycling ideas from the past, since he constantly spoke about seeking 
“bold” and “imaginative” policies, the similarities between their two approaches are 
striking.  
The Good Neighbor policy, broadly speaking, focused on the principals of 
nonintervention and trade. In practice, nonintervention meant that the United States 
would recognize unsavory governments, such as the regime of Anastasio Somoza in 
Nicaragua, as long the government in power was somewhat amendable to supporting 
broader U.S. interests. When greater U.S. interests were involved, Roosevelt was very 
capable of dropping both “the letter and spirit of the Good Neighbor policy.”10 In terms 
                                                 
7Quoted in John D. Martz, ed., United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and 
Challenge, 1961-1986, Latin American Studies Series (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 30. 
8 Quoted in Rabe, The Killing Zone, 118. 
9 Ibid., 
10 Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of 
Latin America in World War II (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003),3. 
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of trade, a similar calculation took place. The president would drastically reduce tariffs 
but only on a reciprocal basis.11 One way to understand Roosevelt’s U.S-Latin American 
policy is as historian Frederick Pike offers through the lens of realpolitik. Pike 
encapsulates his thought process as the people of the United States were “no better 
neighbors than” they “had to be.”12  
The election of a new president, particularly one of a different party from his 
predecessor, can provide the mechanism for policy changes in the U.S. government. A 
new president can bring new ideas and people into the government bureaucracy who can 
incrementally, or sometimes dramatically, change the course of government policy. 
Nixon certainly represented a break from his predecessor Lyndon B. Johnson. Many of 
his most dramatic policy changes, such as Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, took 
root early in his presidency as Nixon laid the foundations of his foreign policy and 
legacy. Nixon had the same opportunity to sow a new Latin American policy in his first 
year in office.  
Nixon came into office with more firsthand experience in Latin America than any 
other U.S. president in history. His official trips as Vice President included two tours of 
the region, one to Central America and the Caribbean in 1955, and one to South America 
in 1958. In 1959, he was the highest-ranking U.S official to meet with Fidel Castro 
during his tour of the United States after the Cuban Revolution. As Vice President, he 
                                                 
11 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 500–501. 
12 Fredrick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (University of 
Texas Press, 1995), xi–xii. 
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even once offered a spirited defense of the Good Neighbor policy as a better example to 
the world than the Soviet Unions’ use of satellites.13 Often overlooked by historians was 
Nixon’s first experience in Latin America. In 1940, Nixon embarked on a two-week road 
trip of Mexico on the newly built Pan-American Highway during his honeymoon with his 
new bride Pat. The experience must have been somewhat positive since both Pat and 
Richard Nixon returned to Mexico for their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary in 1965. As 
president, Nixon would strongly lobby for the completion and expansion of the Pan 
American Highway, a Good Neighbor era project. 
Nixon’s openness to change in U.S. policy was evident from the campaign trail. 
During one speech, he called for a “sweeping reevaluation” of the Alliance for Progress, 
the largest U.S. aid program in history to Latin America. Nixon recognized the declining 
nature of hemispheric policy when he drew a clear contrast between himself and Johnson 
accusing Johnson of being unable or unwilling to “give our neighbors the priority status 
and effective aid which they deserve.” The thrust of his overall message was that “trade 
instead of aid” should be the guiding principal in formulating hemispheric policy.”14 
Nixon’s message also stood in contrast to his opponent Hubert Humphrey, who 
emphasized the positive aspects of the Alliance for Progress and generally advocated 
maintaining the status quo without substantial changes to its basic structure.15 The focus 
                                                 
13 “Nixon Denounces Soviet Satellites: Contrasts Control by Russia With U. S. Good-Neighbor Policy in 
the Americas,” New York Times, November 2, 1955. 
14 Robert B. Semple Jr., “Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations: Asks Major ‘Re-Evaluation’ of Alliance for 
Progress Nixon Urges Help for Latin Nations,” New York Times, October 15, 1968,  
15 Benjamin Welles, “Humphrey and Nixon Differ on Latin-American Aim,” New York Times, November 
5, 1968,  
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on increased trade within the hemisphere was similar to Roosevelt’s Latin American 
policy. 
While the failure to mention hemispheric relations in his inaugural speech raised 
concerns among the diplomats, the administration’s next step should have somewhat 
ameliorated their worries. The day after the inauguration, Nixon’s first official meeting 
with a foreign dignitary was with the head of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Secretary General Galo Plaza. In a wide-ranging conversation, the two leaders touched on 
social, political, and economic issues in the region.16 During the conversation, the 
secretary general made an interesting recommendation. When Nixon asked what his next 
move for Latin America should be, Galo Plaza’s statement was short and to the point 
“Send Nelson Rockefeller there,” he stated, “his name is magic.”17 Nixon agreed to 
Plaza’s recommendation and proceeded that same day to call Rockefeller, the Governor 
of New York at the time, who accepted the president’s request to lead a fact-finding 
mission to the region. It would take several months of planning and logistical 
coordination before Governor Rockefeller started his mission in May 1969.  
Before the mission began, a particularly important meeting took place among 
Latin American countries purposely without the presence of the United States. The initial 
publication of the Consensus of Viña del Mar, a lengthy list outlining broad areas of 
hemispheric agreement, in April 1969 marked the first time that a large majority of Latin 
                                                 
16  Benjamin Welles, “President Talks With O.A.S. Chief: Galo Plaza Is Nixon’s First Official Foreign 
Visitor,” New York Times, January 22, 1969,  
17 Joseph Persico, Imperial Rockefeller: A Biography of Nelson Rockefeller, 1st edition (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1982), 100. 
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American countries met to discuss the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations without 
the United States present. The Consensus of Viña del Mar included several foundational 
principles such as respect for treaties, sovereignty, nonintervention, and economic 
improvement initiatives. Nixon personally received the document in June and took it 
seriously, leading to the creation of a special commission to examine the issues in the 
report, and influencing his forthcoming major policy speech on the Western 
Hemisphere.18 
Another event that would bring Latin America to the forefront came in the 
summer of 1969. Early July marked the opening of hostilities in the so-called “Soccer 
War” between Honduras and El Salvador, the first open war between states in the 
Western Hemisphere since 1935. The proximate cause of the war was rioting caused by 
the defeat of Honduras by El Salvador in a World Cup qualifying match, which led 
Honduras to cut off diplomatic relations and expel several thousand El Salvadoran 
citizens living in Honduras. The true cause of the war, however, was a complicated 
border dispute dating to Spanish imperialism, clashes between Hondurans and El 
Salvadorans living in Honduras, and a weak government in El Salvador. Nixon took a 
personal interest in the conflict, instructing Kissinger talk to get Rockefeller’s advice and 
expressing his hope to “get a little credit” as a “peacemaker.”19 The United States would 
ultimately support a regional approach to peace through the OAS. 
                                                 
18 Gabriel Valdes S., “The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Viña Del 
Mar,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 17, no. 2 (May 1, 1975): 210–212. 
19 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation(subsequently called Telcon), July 14, 1969 
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In 1969, the National Security Council (NSC) spent a significant amount of time 
studying Latin America, generating reports on specific countries such as Peru and Brazil 
and on broader topics such as the role of the Catholic Church in the region.20 The study 
on Peru focused on the 1968 expropriation of International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) 
property, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. The first decision point for the U.S. 
government would not come until April of 1969, when an obscure U.S. law known as the 
Hickenlooper Amendment21 would force presidential action. The study on Brazil was 
different since no major crisis triggered the study. It was the country’s growing economy 
and population, known as the “Brazilian miracle,” that would later lead Nixon to 
pronounce, “Brazil is the key to the future.”22 The broader NSC studies would focus on 
hemispheric trends such as the continuing importance of the Catholic Church and the 
military.23 
The relative importance of Latin American policy in 1969, as compared to 
subsequent years in the Nixon White House, is particularly evident in a study of 
Kissinger’s telephone transcripts. Kissinger conducted much of his business on the 
telephone, and the subjects of his transcripts could be reasonably used as a proxy for the 
foreign policy emphasis of the White House. Of the 136 “Telcons” relevant to Latin 
America from the inauguration until Nixon’s resignation, over fifty percent are from 
                                                 
20 See NSSM 15, 42, 67. 
21 The Hickenlooper Amendment of 1962 required the president to cut off U.S. foreign aid to countries 
that expropriated private U.S. property without beginning to provide compensation within six months. 
22 Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009), 9. 
23 NSSM 68. 
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1969.24  Nixon’s first year in office was the one moment in his presidency when his 
administration focused on Latin America and developed a strategic vision for the region.  
This master’s report will focus on the closing months of 1969 and the final steps 
in the creation of the government’s strategic vision toward the region. In order to 
understand U.S. hemispheric policy, this report will focus on two discrete events that 
highlight different challenges and aspects in Washington’s search for a coherent Latin 
American policy. The first event was the ill-fated Operation Intercept, an attempt by the 
Nixon administration to stem the flow of marijuana across the Mexican border. Operation 
Intercept, the largest peacetime search and seizure operation in U.S. history up to that 
point, highlighted many of the sources of friction between U.S. government agencies. 
Additionally, the operation provides an example of the growing importance of the NSC in 
government decision making and the ability of the Nixon administration to learn from 
past mistakes. This incident also provides an example of the agency of the Mexican 
government, the other half of the foreign policy equation. The other event this report will 
highlight is Nixon’s one major speech on Latin America, which he gave on October 31, 
1969. This speech was the culmination of almost a year’s worth of events, meetings, and 
reports that morphed into the White House’s strategic vision toward the region.  
This report contains four chapters. Chapter one examines the planning process 
and initial execution of Operation Intercept from its roots in the presidential campaign 
                                                 
24 From National Security Archive “The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. 
Diplomacy, 1969-1977.” seventy-three conversations in 1969. Even though a higher priority in 1969, the 
subject of Latin America constituted only about 4% of his conversations. This is still much higher than the 
rest of his time as NSA. For example, in 1970 Latin America was a subject of his conversations less than 
1/10 of one percent of the time, or seventeen conversations out of 2,810.   
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through the end of September 1969 when the operation was in full swing. The planning 
and initial execution of the operation was disastrous. In chapter two, the report will focus 
on Nixon and Kissinger’s reception of the Rockefeller report and their initial reactions to 
the recommendation. Chapter three will then return to Operation Intercept as Mexico and 
the United States determined a method to stop the heavy handed enforcement and moved 
to a more cooperative approach. The final chapter explores the drafting and delivery of 
Nixon’s major policy speech to the Inter-American Press club on October 31, 1969, the 
one point in his presidency when he publically stated a new policy toward the region. 
While Nixon had an opportunity to improve U.S.-Latin American relations, he 
ultimately failed. After the initial efforts to focus on the region, other foreign policy 
priorities such as Vietnam and China overwhelmed the administration.. Domestic 
budgetary pressures slashed foreign aid spending and forced the establishment of trade 
restrictions not only for Latin America but also for other regions. Additionally, even 
when focused on the region, such as the state visit of Brazil’s military dictator Emílio 
Garrastazu Médici in December of 1971, he suffered domestic and international criticism 
for working with military dictatorships, much more than Roosevelt ever did for working 
with military strongmen. For all the hard work and effort spent on creating a new Latin 
American policy early in the administration, the region generally reverted to its normal 
position in Cold War decision making—to the background. 
 11 
Chapter 1-- Operation Intercept 
On September 8, 1969, Nixon and the President of Mexico, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 
met for the dedication of the jointly built Amistad (friendship) dam, located along the 
U.S. Mexican border on the Rio Grande and then proceeded to meet on Mexico’s side of 
the border for a bilateral meeting. This event marked the first of Nixon’s two trips to 
Mexico, the only Latin American country he would visit as president. The wives of both 
men and thousands of observers braved the hundred-degree heat to mark the opening of 
the dam. Both leaders gave optimistic and enthusiastic speeches during the dedication 
ceremony. Nixon hoped for a “furtherance of an ideal friendship” and continuation of the 
“special relationship” that bound the two countries together, while Díaz Ordaz stated that 
whatever problems existed “will not become a barrier between us.” Both presidents also 
commented that they were glad that their predecessors had agreed to change the name of 
the dam to Amistad away from the original name Diablo (Devil).25  
Just a few weeks later when Operation Intercept began on September 21, 1969, 
both sides would quickly forget their kind words as the border between the two countries 
became an unofficial battleground in the undeclared “War on Drugs.”26 Operation 
Intercept, the largest peacetime search and seizure operation in U.S. history, called for 
                                                 
25Robert B. Semple Jr., “Big Dam Dedicated By Nixon and Diaz On Mexican Border: A Day in the Life of 
the President: Some Solemnity, Some Exhilaration Big Dam Dedicated by Nixon and Diaz,” New York 
Times, September 9, 1969 and Carroll Kilpatrick, “Border Dam Dedicated by 2 Presidents: Friendship 
Border Dam Dedicated To Further Friendship Best in History Now,” The Washington Post, September 9, 
1969. 
26 Nixon would not use the term “War on Drugs” until 1971 contemporary newspaper accounts were using 
the military language see “Nixon Seeks French Aid in War on Drugs,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 
1969.. 
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obtrusive searches on the border and wreaked havoc on border communities until its 
conclusion on October 10, 1969. The result of the operation, however, highlighted 
strengths in Mexican diplomacy and initiated soul searching within the administration 
that would lead to a temporary improvement in relations with Mexico. 
While President Nixon saw marijuana use in the United States as a large problem, 
President Díaz Ordaz did not agree. Domestic marijuana use was likely insignificant in 
Mexico since smugglers grew the vast majority of marijuana for export. The larger 
problem for Mexico was the abuse of inhalants.27 In the meeting after the dam dedication, 
Díaz Ordaz requested additional aid for drug eradication efforts in the form of helicopters 
and light planes and informed the attendees there had been an interruption in aid from the 
United States on the narcotics front. Mexico’s president, however, ended on a positive 
note stating “he would be happy to help [the U.S.] in any way that he could.”28 He 
emphasized Mexico’s willingness to cooperate, following the suggestion of his foreign 
ministry, which, sensing the sensitivity of the drug issue, directly advised the president 
“not let the United States leave with the impression that Mexico has not done everything 
that she could do.”29 At no point in the conversation did Nixon mention or hint about the 
                                                 
27 María Celia Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1995). 
28 Memoranda of Meetings, El Mirador, Mexico (Amistad Dam), September 8, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1972, 
Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics (Washington, DC: Department of State), available online 
at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d436, last accessed on 7 April 2014. 
29 Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada. Acervo Histórico Diplomático. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 
(AHGE) SPR-634-1 Entrevista Del Presidente Gustavo Diaz Ordaz Con El Presidente Richard M. Nixon, 
Celebrada En La Presa De La Amistad. 1969. 
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upcoming Operation Intercept, leaving Díaz Ordaz unaware of the upcoming increase in 
border security. 
Nixon’s emphasis on narcotics and stopping the drug trade began during his 
campaign for office. On September 16, 1968, coincidentally the same day he appeared on 
the television show Laugh In, candidate Richard Nixon spoke to a capacity crowd in 
Anaheim, California. While the broad theme of the rally centered on “law and order,” 
Nixon stressed the growing threat of narcotics. Among his ideas, Nixon advocated for a 
“multinational commission” to stem the tide of drugs. He also stated he would triple the 
number of border agents as recommended by a commission chartered by the Johnson 
administration. Finally, he would “accelerate the development of tools and weapons to 
detect narcotics in transit.”30 While he also mentioned unspecified help to current addicts, 
his speech centered on interdiction and restricting supply. 
In April 1969, Nixon instructed his attorney general, John Mitchell, and Treasury 
Secretary, David Kennedy, to assemble a task force to study the issue of drugs and 
narcotics. Their report, released two months later on June 6, reflected a consensus with 
seven different government departments contributing to the report. Unusually for a matter 
involving foreign policy, the State Department participated only in “an advisory 
capacity” and did not contribute substantively to the final product. However, the report 
                                                 
30 Bergholz, Richard. "Nixon Will Not Curb Issue of Law and Order." Los Angeles Times, Sep 17, 1968. 
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claimed that the State Department was fully on board with “whole hearted support,” 
according to the contribution made by Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson.31  
The core of the Task Force’s recommendations focused on unilateral U.S. actions 
on the border with Mexico. While several of the recommendations were somewhat trivial, 
such as building parking lots on the U.S. side of the border to allow pedestrians to cross 
into Mexico on foot, the report also advised larger efforts. For instance, it called for 
increased fencing where it would have “the most beneficial effect” and substantial 
increases in funding for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Customs. 32 Most likely for political 
reason, the Nixon administration wanted to implement a plan as soon as possible in order 
to demonstrate the president’s resolve to the American public. The largest border 
enforcement action in U.S. history emerged from this ad hoc taskforce with very limited 
time to put together a complicated plan and with limited input from the State Department. 
Before the U.S. government could implement the plan, on June 9, 1969, the U.S. 
and Mexican governments met at a conference focused specifically on the problem of 
illegal drugs. According to one high level Nixon aide, Gordon Liddy, the task force 
finished the report by June 6 in order to have it ready for the conference. Liddy, when 
recounting the results of the meeting, mentioned that the Mexican delegation, “using 
                                                 
31 "Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs", 6 June 1969, 
National Security Archive, available online at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/, 
accessed on 10 March 2014. 
32 Ibid., 21. 
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diplomatic language,” told the delegation words to the effect of “go piss up a rope.”33 
One anonymous Mexican diplomat remembered the event differently. In his recollection, 
the strong tenor of the U.S. delegation surprised him since this was an informal meeting. 
Additionally, the Mexican contingent commented that in February, the Mexican 
government launched the largest marijuana eradication campaign in country’s history 
involving over 2,000 government troops.34 Whatever the true resolve of Mexico’s drug 
eradication effort, the American contingent left the conference ready to ratchet up the 
pressure on Mexico. 
Operation Intercept began due to an unplanned, messy failure of communication 
within the U.S. government. On August 28, 1969, the 11th Naval District announced it 
was going to place Tijuana off limits two weeks later on September 15 to the one hundred 
and fifty thousand military service members located in San Diego under the order of 
Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations. The closure of Mexico to military personal 
was one of the explicit options the original Presidential Taskforce on Marijuana and 
Dangerous Drugs had advocated. However, within hours of the publication, the Pentagon 
rescinded the order as premature since it was still under consideration.35  
After the confusion surrounding travel restrictions placed on military personnel in 
San Diego, the New York Times leaked several details of Nixon’s opening action in the 
                                                 
33 G. Gordon Liddy, Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
134. 
34 Quoted in Richard B. Craig, “Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure,” 559–60. 
35 Ruben Salazar, “‘Civilian Underling Blamed for Confusion on Tijuana Ban,” Los Angeles Times, 
August 30, 1969. 
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undeclared “War on Drugs.” In its September 9 edition, the same edition that reported on 
the Amistad dam ceremony, Times reporter Felix Belair Jr. quoted extensively from the 
June 6 Presidential Task Force report, which the White House had not released 
publically. The paper claimed that Operation Intercept would “constitute the nation’s 
largest peacetime search and seizure operation by civil authorities.” The paper also 
reported that President Nixon had “summarized” the plan to President Díaz Ordaz during 
their meeting at the opening of the dam.36 This leak in the New York Times, along with 
the unauthorized release of plan to ban service members from Tijuana, caused the U.S. 
ambassador to Mexico Robert H. McBride to ask tougher questions about the value of the 
operation.  
 State Department officials generally opposed Operation Intercept, but their 
response was at best unorganized and fragmented. Gordon Liddy noted that the June 6 
report “paid lip-service to the Mexican efforts—more so than we would have but for the 
Department of State.”37 On September 12, 1969, just a few days after the New York Times 
leak, Ambassador McBride cabled back to Washington with major concerns about the 
operation, noting that from his point of view, “it appears that repeated leaks have now 
minimized possibilities of success of Operation Intercept and that its value…seems to 
have decreased greatly.” He also mentioned that the U.S. Navy order “even indicated the 
date of [the] operation,” implying that the original date for Operation Intercept was 
                                                 
36 Felix Belair Jr., “Mexico is Asked to Help Combat Drug Smuggling,” New York Times, September 9, 
1969. 
37 Liddy, Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy, 133. 
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September 15, the day before Mexico’s Independence Day.38 As a further illustration of 
confusion within the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Charles Meyer, theoretically responsible for all of Latin America, was not 
involved with the planning of Operation Intercept. Additionally, even during the 
execution of the operation, Secretary Meyer was often not part of the decision making 
process.39 This spoke poorly of the task force planning the operation, but also of the State 
Department for cutting out the highest-level cabinet official dedicated to Latin America. 
The incompetence of the State Department would become a recurring theme in the 
formulation of Latin American policy. 
 On September 21, 1969, at 2:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, Operation Intercept 
officially commenced. By this point, leaks and press briefings on the U.S. side had 
removed the element of surprise. On the first day of the operation, inspections leading out 
of Tijuana backed up traffic for six miles with a peak wait time of three to four hours. 
The morale among the U.S. citizens in the group was, according to one report, “high” 
with one mother expressing her opinion that the tougher the inspections, the less she 
would have to worry about her kids. The enforcement action made no significant arrest 
on the official start day of the operation. Two days before, however, one of the newly 
installed radars on the border diverted an unregistered plane that was loaded with 532 
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bricks of marijuana weighing over a thousand pounds.40 The U.S. government made no 
other significant arrests after the start of Operation Intercept. 
 The next day, the enforcement actions on the border caused shops to open without 
the usual customers. As one U.S. executive in California sarcastically noted, “at least we 
solved our parking problem.” In Texas, the Chairman of the Laredo Chamber of 
Commerce remarked that the U.S. government had consulted neither his group nor other 
civic leaders he knew. 41 No one was spared inspection; even Mexico’s consul general in 
El Paso was “rudely searched” by agents from New York on temporary duty to the 
border.42 By day four of the operation, a U.S. representative briefed that Operation 
Intercept was going smoothly, even though the amount of marijuana seized during the 
operation was a fraction of the amount made under the old border inspection system. 
Even though the government insisted that procedures were going well, and citizens on 
both sides of the border had reduced the amount of cross border commutes, wait times 
could still reach up to two hours during peak times.43 Complaints were starting to reach 
the ear of government policy makers, and they would soon have to respond more visibly. 
 The two largest Mexican newspapers, El Universal and Excélsior, were largely 
silent in the first days of Operation Intercept. According to the State Department, this was 
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a deliberate effort by the government-dominated press to strike a tolerant tone about the 
operation at first.44 The government took a more confrontational stance when on 
September 25 Operation Intercept became front-page news on El Universal. The story 
emphasized the human suffering of Mexican migrant workers, saying some of them had 
lost their jobs due to delays at the border. Additionally, the article mentioned that 
commercial interests on both sides of the border were protesting the unilateral move as 
not conducive to business. 45 Excélsior also ran the story on the front page with the 
headline reading, “Not a Single Gram of Marijuana Found by U.S. Border Agents.”46 The 
next day, the story once again dropped off the front page of the Mexico City press as the 
United States and Mexico began initial negotiations to end Operation Intercept in New 
York City.  
 The accounts of the operation in Mexicali’s newspaper La Voz de la Frontera 
were much more forceful than the coverage out of Mexico City due to the city’s location 
closer to the border and long distance from the central government. The front-page of the 
paper led with a picture of the long line of vehicular traffic and an account of the effects 
of the operation on ordinary Mexicans.47 The coverage continued throughout the next few 
days with multiple newspaper articles. For example, on September 26, the paper noted 
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pressure placed on the federal government by the trade union Confederación 
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesino (CROC) and its hopes for the upcoming 
summit.48 In addition to the news items, multiple editorials and letters to the editor 
appeared in the paper just days after the commencement of Operation Intercept. 
 Besides news reports, the mood of the population was clear in the advertisements 
that appeared in the border paper. One two-page advertisement sponsored by the chamber 
of commerce depicted a long line of cars imploring Mexicans to buy locally and avoid 
the hassle of intrusive searches at the border. The ad promised the reader that local 
products were the same price, varied, of high quality, and “above all no one will frisk 
you!”49 Another advertisement in the paper placed by the chamber of commerce and 
other entities such as the bureau for national tourism asked Mexican citizens to stay home 
in order to allow “tourists, students, and people with urgency and necessity” to cross the 
border expeditiously.50 A jeweler provided his own spin on the trend by sarcastically 
thanking Nixon for making locals see that it was better to shop in Mexico than the United 
States.51  
As the operation continued, the stories in the mainstream Mexican press would 
gradually grow in intensity. In a front-page story, El Universal reported a boycott of 
American goods in the United States launched by ten Mexican border cities dubbed 
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“Operation Dignity.” The boycott would begin at the beginning of October.52 Operation 
Dignity never fully materialized since the border communities never unified on one plan. 
Additionally, Mexican consumers refused to stay home, and while cross border traffic did 
slow down, it remained at a heavy level throughout Operation Intercept.53 The threat of a 
boycott, even if not well executed, demonstrated Mexican citizens’ level of anger on the 
issue of the border. 
While the events of Operation Intercept were in full swing, the Nixon 
administration was nearing the end of its review on Latin American policy. Before the 
implementation of the unilateral enforcement action, Nixon received Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller’s long awaited report on the region. Nixon and his staff, however, did not 
begin to fully read or process the report until the week that Operation Intercept kicked 
off. Additionally, at least one important meeting and several important decisions on the 
content of the report took place while Operation Intercept was underway. The linkage 
between the two events are virtually nonexistent in the historical record; however, the 
chronological overlap between the two events does suggest a moment in time when Latin 
American affairs took a more prominent role in the administration. 
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Chapter 2-- Reception of the Rockefeller Report 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller initially briefed Kissinger and Nixon about his 
findings on September 3, before Nixon’s dedication of the Amistad dam.54  According to 
a memorandum received by Nixon the day prior, the conversation likely would include 
several “small items.” However, one item relating to Panama required his attention. 
Panama’s leader, General Omar Torrijos, in his meeting with Rockefeller, had requested 
certain technical assistance to “re-establish the democratic process.” His request on the 
surface was a bit odd since he came to power in a military coup d’état just a year earlier. 
Rockefeller recommended appointing a political advisor to assist Torrijos, but also 
requested more guidance. Kissinger advised against appointing an advisor for multiple 
reasons centering on the risk of sidelining the State Department, undermining Nixon’s 
new ambassador to Panama, and lack of clarity of Torrijos’ true motives.55 Kissinger, in 
making his recommendation, followed the advice of his chief advisor on Latin America 
Viron Vaky. His advisor was much more colorful in his advice calling the situation 
“delicate,” ”embarrassing,” and “unnecessary involvement in other nations’ domestic 
matters.” He strongly advised against Rockefeller playing “Secretary of State this way.”56  
In order to understand Nixon’s attempt to formulate a hemispheric policy, one has 
to understand Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller had a long history with the southern 
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continent. His formative experiences in the region came in 1935 with a trip to the oil 
fields of Venezuela. During his trip, he was struck by what one aid later recounted as the 
“raw vitality and wild beauty” of the country and region.57 The self-imposed segregation 
of North American workers, few of whom spoke Spanish, also unnerved him. 
Rockefeller, who took a two-week crash course in Spanish before his trip, attempted to 
engage with the local population in their native language.58 He continued to improve his 
Spanish over time, and his basic fluency continued to be an asset as time progressed. 
Deeply involved in both business and philanthropic work in the region, his experience 
would lead to his extraordinary appointment to a post within the U.S. government by 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during World War II.59  
One of Rockefeller’s biographers recounted how his first position under 
Roosevelt introduced him to the intricacies of government work. Rockefeller made 
mistakes, but he “learned more from his mistakes than his successes.”60 During his time 
in government, Rockefeller developed an admiration for FDR second only to his 
grandfather. Coincidently, coming in third was his admiration for General George C. 
Marshall.61 His appointment, as the newly created Coordinator of inter-American Affairs 
(CIAA), increased his prominence among Latin American government officials. 
Essentially, his job was to counter the effects of Nazi propaganda in the Western 
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Hemisphere. He sponsored a variety of programs including loan guarantees to Walt 
Disney to create a South American themed cartoon to highlight American culture.62 His 
position as an outsider led to a certain amount of tension with the State Department, 
which he regularly circumvented in planning his initiatives.63 For example, the CIAA 
launched one particularly disastrous advertising campaign where, among other mistakes, 
the agency sponsored Spanish language advertisements in Brazil. The CIA planned this 
particular campaign without coordinating with the State Department. Undersecretary of 
State, Sumner Welles, received word of the botched campaign and briefed FDR. 
Roosevelt issued a rebuke to Rockefeller urging him to play nice with the States 
Department because in a “showdown between your office and the [State] Department” he 
would side with the State Department.64  
While there was bad blood between Rockefeller and the State Department, he still 
accepted an appointment to become FDR’s Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs in December of 1944. As an Assistant Secretary, the Eurocentric 
bureaucracy continued to stifle him because they were suspicious of Latin American 
concerns. Rockefeller fought hard to treat Latin America as a distinct region shepherding 
the passage of the Act of Chapultepec, an informal defense agreement later formalized as 
the Rio Pact. In one of his last acts as Assistant Secretary, Rockefeller attended the UN 
conference at San Francisco. During the conference, he lobbied for Latin American 
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demands of recognition of the Act of Chapultepec and removal of the Security Council 
veto. Later realizing he had gone too far in supporting the Latin delegation, Rockefeller, 
who submitted a pro forma letter of resignation after FDR’s death, soon found himself 
without a job.65 Rockefeller used his experience and contacts built under FDR and 
Truman over two decades later in an attempt to reorient U.S. policy. Although 
Nixon originally envisioned a small-scale trip to a half a dozen countries or so, Governor 
Rockefeller planned to visit all of Central and South America and several Caribbean 
islands. Charles Meyer, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
opposed the scale of the trip arguing for a “low profile” approach and advised 
Rockefeller to avoid a “dog and pony show.”66 Meyer’s boss, Secretary of State William 
Rogers, also desired a limited trip advising the governor to “keep it small.”67 The 
governor ultimately received the president’s support for a larger scale visit with limited 
interference from the State Department and hired several experts to accompany him on 
his trip. All told, Rockefeller would spend around $750,000 of his own money, consume 
countless hours of his time, and stake his reputation on the success of the trip and 
subsequent report.68 
Official goodwill and fact-finding trips to Latin America from the United States 
were nothing new. Rockefeller, in his governmental position under Roosevelt, sponsored 
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several goodwill tours, while President Dwight Eisenhower sent his brother Milton twice 
to the region in order to write a series of reports. Eisenhower also sent Vice President 
Nixon in 1955 and 1958 and visited Latin America himself in 1960 after the 
announcement of a trade pact between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Both President 
Kennedy and President Johnson would also tour the region in an effort to gain publicity 
the Alliance for Progress aid program.69 What made Rockefeller’s trip different was the 
scale of the trip, since he intended to visit twenty-three different countries, and the timing 
of the trip early in an administration. 
Nixon and Kissinger originally wanted Rockefeller to begin his listening and fact-
finding tour in February, fitting subsequent trips into his schedule as he saw fit. 
Rockefeller, however, could not begin the tour as quickly as the administration hoped 
since he was facing budgetary issues back in New York.70 As planning for the 
presidential mission continued, Rockefeller periodically communicated with Kissinger on 
logistical and substantive matters related to the trip. One conversation conveyed Nixon’s 
hope that Rockefeller’s trip could “put his Latin American policy on a new basis.” The 
Governor responded, “he is going to listen and to report to the President.” Continuing 
Rockefeller suggested, “if his mission results in suggestions that will be useful, fine—
then the President can announce policy.” The conversation subsequently turned to the 
security situation in Guatemala foreshadowing some of the issues Rockefeller would face 
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on his trip.71 The president continued to take a personal interest in Rockefeller’s 
preparations, at one point requesting that Rockefeller meet with Archbishop Raimondi, 
the Apostolic delegate to the United States, since the president felt that he brought a 
unique perspective to Latin America.72  
The first leg of Rockefeller’s trip (May 11 to May 19, 1969), consisting of 
Mexico and Central America, began with no major issues in Mexico. At his first stop he 
began his speech on the tarmac with the following statement saying he came, “not to 
bring advice, but rather to take advice” he would continue with “I bring no new program, 
no simple answers, no easy slogans.”73 Video from Mexico depicts exuberant crowds 
greeting him and recorded Rockefeller and his wife touring a hospital were children 
greeted them with a traditional dance routine.74 Certain countries in Central America 
proved to be less inviting. In Guatemala he was not allowed to stay overnight in 
Guatemala City and had his meetings with the government officials outside the city for 
his safety. In Honduras, he faced hostile crowds made up mostly of students. Instead of 
disengaging from the crowd, he waded in and engaged the students in a debate. A 
newspaper reporter later quoted him as saying, “See. Nobody laid a hand on me. But 
somebody lifted my wallet.”75 
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The second leg (May 27 to June 3, 1969) of the mission faced problems even 
before it began since Peru canceled Rockefeller’s visit in protest of sanctions imposed by 
the United States due to the fining of U.S. fishing vessels impounded in disputed waters 
of the coast of Peru.76 The situation in Bogotá, Colombia, his first stop, did not improve 
the tone of his trip. Students violently protested his arrival in the capital city, as protestors 
clashed with riot police. Colombian security rerouted Rockefeller’s motorcade around the 
worst of the violence along a route that had more riot police than well-wishers.77 Protests 
continued in Ecuador and Bolivia with the Bolivian president meeting with Rockefeller at 
the airport due to the volatile situation.78 By this point, Venezuela had canceled its 
portion of the visit, citing security concerns and likely remembering the disastrous visit of 
then Vice President Richard Nixon in 1958, when angry protestors surround his 
motorcade. One reporter, who was on the scene the day Rockefeller was supposed to 
arrive, reported that the city was covered with posters reading “Rockefeller, Venezuela 
Repudiates You” placed by a leftist Catholic youth group.79 At the halfway mark of his 
mission, Rockefeller reportedly took the protests in stride saying that while he did “not 
want his mission to leave a trail of bloodshed” he would not mind “being a lightning rod 
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for Latin-American protest if this will focus the attention of United States political 
leaders on inter-American problems.”80  
Some politicians in fact did begin to pay more attention to the presidential 
mission even if not in the way that Rockefeller hoped. Senator Frank Church, the 
chairman of the Senate’s subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and an ardent 
critic of Nixon, called the tour at the halfway mark a “fiasco” and accused the 
administration of “conducting foreign policy by gimmickry.”81  
The military dictatorship of Brazil marked the first stop of the third leg of the 
presidential mission (16 June-22 June). Brazil, unlike many of the previous stops, was 
calm since the Brazilian government had rounded up thousands of potential protestors, 
releasing them after the governor had left.82 The roundup, while harsh and dictatorial, 
demonstrated the importance Brazil placed on relations with the United States. In 
Uruguay, the last country he visited on this leg of the trip, the firebombing of a General 
Motors plant greeted him. Additionally, due to security concerns he could not meet with 
officials inside the capital but instead had to meet in the virtually deserted resort town of 
Punta del Este. Rockefeller continued his upbeat assessment—at least in public—stating 
that this leg marked a “turning point” and asserting “A pattern of consultation has now 
been established which is providing the points of view, the information and counsel 
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which the President was desirous of obtaining as a basis for formulation of U.S. policy in 
the western hemisphere.” 
Rockefeller’s final leg included several Caribbean countries outside the scope of 
this report. However, his first stop to Argentina proved quite eventful. According to one 
of Rockefeller’s aides, “Argentina proved the worst.”83 The governor arrived to the near 
simultaneous firebombing of seventeen Minimax grocery stores co-owned by his family. 
Ten thousand troops patrolled the capital Buenos Aires, and Rockefeller under the cover 
of darkness met with six leftist leaders without the Argentine government’s knowledge.84 
The volatile situation in Argentina, while related to the turbulence in other Latin 
American countries, was also inflamed by local events. Specifically the Cordobazo an 
extended and violent workers’ strike in the city of Córdoba where violence had peeked 
the month before Rockefeller’s visit. When the trip ended he reflected, “this Presidential 
Mission has brought home to the American people that all is not well in the Western 
Hemisphere and that there is urgent need for changes in our policies.”85 He later 
highlighted his recommendations for change in the written summary of the trips findings. 
 Rockefeller’s final written findings focused on the forces of progress in Latin 
America. The region in his view, like the rest of the world, was experiencing rapid 
change, and while the United States could not “control” change, the United States had to 
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“understand” change in order to “shape intelligently and realistically our relationships.”86 
Rockefeller defined change as the “crucial characteristic of our time.”  He saw change as 
disruptive and saw the result in stark terms as either “tremendously constructive or 
tremendously destructive.”87 
In Rockefeller’s analysis, two of the main contributors to change were ironically 
two of the more traditionally conservative institutions. The first of these institutions was 
the Catholic Church.88 This propensity for change was a new role for the Church because, 
as the report noted, it had worked “hand in hand with the landowners to provide 
‘stability.’” Rockefeller did temper his remarks noting that the Church in some situations 
was “vulnerable to subversive penetration.” He concluded this section of the report 
unsure of the role the Church would play in the future. Elements within the Church might 
be “ready to undertake a revolution,” but he was not sure “as to the ultimate nature of the 
revolution itself or as to the governmental system by which the justice it seeks can be 
realized.”89 The other avenue of change was the military. Rockefeller took direct aim at 
the many critics of military governments in the United States such as Senator Frank 
Church when he stated in the report, “we will have to give increasing recognition to the 
fact that many new military leaders are deeply motivated by the need for social and 
                                                 
86 Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas: The Official Report of a United States 
Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, New York Times edition (Quadrangle Books, 1969), 24. 
87 Ibid. 
88 For more of Rockefeller’s analysis on the Catholic Church see Theresa Keeley, “Nelson Rockefeller’s 
1969 Mission to Latin America and the Catholic Church,” 2011 
,https://web.archive.org/web/20140108152712/http://www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/keeley.pdf. 
89 Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, 31. 
 32 
economic progress.” He continued:  in “many cases, it will be more useful for the United 
States to try to work with them in these efforts, rather than to abandon or insult them 
because we are conditioned by arbitrary ideological stereotypes.”90 Ironically while he 
argued that the average Latin American military leader had changed, his policy 
prescription looked very similar to Roosevelt’s treatment of military dictators. 
Rockefeller’s recommendations reproduced what one historian has argued was a built in 
irony of the Good Neighbor policy, “aiding dictators next door for the sake of fighting 
other dictators overseas.”91   
 The recommendations in the report included economic issues, and several 
structural recommendations within the U.S. government. Many of the economic 
recommendations paralleled the Consensus of Viña del Mar including refinancing of debt 
and preference for Latin American trade goods. Possibly the boldest part of the 
recommendations were the proposed reorganizational changes within the U.S. 
government bureaucracy since, according to the report, hemispheric policy could “neither 
be soundly formulated nor effectively carried out” under the current U.S. governmental 
structure. The report explained that current divided decision-making within the U.S. 
government led foreign governments in the hemisphere to become “frustrated and 
humiliated” since their representative could not find a person who could  “make a final 
decision” in the maze of bureaucracy. 92 
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One of the key recommendations was the creation of a Secretary of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs to coordinate all U.S. policy. This new secretary would be the “focal 
point” for all hemispheric matters. While not stated specifically in the recommendations, 
this new position would privilege the Western Hemisphere in the bureaucracy since no 
other region would have a similar secretary. Additionally, the report called for more 
government employees dedicated to Latin American issues in the White House including 
a special office in the NSC.93 Nixon received these recommendations in early September, 
but based of the available documentary record did not read the report until a few weeks 
later in mid-September. 
 Rockefeller had a long and tangled relationship with both Nixon and Kissinger. 
Rockefeller and Nixon were old political rivals competing for the Republican nomination 
in the 1968 presidential race. Rockefeller also had a long relationship with Kissinger, 
whose research he sponsored when he was a professor at Harvard. As one biographer 
wrote about the relationship between the two in the 1950s, “behind Nelson’s back, 
Kissinger sometimes mocked his patron for failing to do his homework. Within earshot, 
he was deferential to the point of sycophancy…”94 Kissinger maintained many of his 
mannerisms when discussing issues with Rockefeller during his tenure as NSA. 
 By September 19, Kissinger had read the report. In a conversation with Governor 
Rockefeller, Kissinger said his final product was “excellent.” Rockefeller reemphasized 
his strong opinion that unless the State Department underwent a serious reorganization 
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and refocused on Latin America, the region would be “lost.” Kissinger agreed with his 
point, and took particular aim at Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer, whom he called a 
“weak man.” At this point, it appeared that Nixon had not read the report, but Kissinger 
was confident he soon would.95 By September 24, the president had read the report, and 
was prepared to “speak very highly” of it if asked to do so. It appeared that the president 
wished to discuss the issue further and invited Rockefeller to a meeting at Camp David 
on the September 29.96  
 Between Rockefeller and Nixon’s first meeting on September 3 and his next 
meeting on September 29, the president refocused on Latin America. Besides the events 
of Operation Intercept, which began on the September 21, the president took interest of 
how his Latin American policy was playing in the press. The president took particular 
interest in an article by James Goodell in the Christian Science Monitor, when he 
personally tasked the State Department with “knocking down” the story.97 The article 
was highly critical of current U.S.-Latin American policy, accusing the administration of 
placing hemispheric relations, “low on its agenda of priorities.” Goodell was particularly 
critical of the administration’s decision to keep the contents of the Rockefeller Report a 
secret. According to an unnamed Latin American diplomat, “It all boils down to the fact 
that Richard Nixon has little interest in doing anything constructive in Latin America.” 
Nixon’s attempt to counter the narrative of the article suggests he was concerned about 
                                                 
95 Telcon, September 19, 1969 
96 Telcon  September 24, 1969. 
97 Memo for the President; October 4, 1969; folder October1-15: Box 3; Hand Writing File; RNPL. 
 35 
Latin American policy, or at a minimum, concerned about the public’s perception of his 
policy. Nixon explored several of these themes in his next meeting with Rockefeller. 
The one-hour meeting on September 29 featuring Nixon, Kissinger, Meyer, and 
Rockefeller provides one of the most expansive views of Latin American policy from 
Nixon in the documentary record. While Nixon expressed his views about Latin America 
freely in the two National Security Council meetings dedicated to Latin America in 1969, 
the small group setting at Camp David allowed him to speak more extensively. In this 
setting, he laid out a vision for the region as he attempted to overcome the current 
constraints of U.S. policy. The meeting began with the President noting that “Latin 
America was in trouble as indicated by such things as the Peruvian problem, the Bolivian 
Coup,[and] Elbricks abduction.”98 Nixon continued by echoing the thinking of Goodell’s 
article. He stated. “Justified or not, people feel Latin America is on the back burner.” 
Continuing with somewhat paternalistic language, he reasoned that the “Latins,” 99 whom 
he called “sensitive,” felt “they should not only be on the front burner, but on front burner 
No. 1.” He felt that the administration should validate their assumptions and “treat them 
with special concern.”100 
Continuing on his monologue, Nixon emphasized his search for “action on Latin 
American policy.” The President wanted “new ideas.” He wanted to “express the special 
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relationship.” Anticipating a critique, he told his distinguished audience, “Oh, but the 
Africans might not like it,” and then promptly told them, “Forget that, forget the 
bureaucracy.” Nixon was primarily referring to the State Department, to which he seemed 
to hold in particular disdain stating “in the 23 years” he had worked with the State 
Department, they “had not had one imaginative, bold new idea.” He then reiterated, “he 
was going to get a new Latin American policy,” and “If it did not come from the State 
Department, it would have to come from within the White House.” 
Returning to the subject of bureaucracy, Nixon seemed sympathetic to 
Rockefeller’s recommendation to create a Secretary for the Western Hemisphere, which 
Nixon envisioned as a “first among equals” in the State Department. He believed that this 
move would be a way to “show our special concerns” to the region. As part of this 
reorganization, he believed that the new secretary should also have in his or her portfolio 
Canada, which at the time was the responsibility of a different arm of the State 
Department. He emphasized that he was flexible with what the policy would look like, 
but wanted “something special,” and “special handing” of all substantive issues. Nixon 
likened the situation to World War II stating it was time to “break out like Patton 
breaking out of the Battle of the Bulge.” He did not want his upcoming speech on Latin 
America to be just “nice words,” he wanted  “to do things.” 
Switching gears, the president wanted to discuss an important issue raised in the 
Rockefeller Report, how to handle the military. Working with the military was important 
in so far as it was in the nation’s interest “to keep things stable.” Nixon felt the United 
States could be “selective” in providing aid to military goverments, but should not 
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condem “the military a la Senator Church.” Determining which government to support 
was a simple calculation which Nixon summed up as “Are they friends or enemies, will 
they be stable, will they accept private investment.” Rockefeller agreed with the president 
providing a personal example of how he convinced the military government of Paraguay 
to chose a better qualified American company over a French company that had been 
paying bribes. The governor chose this example to illustrate how a policy of engagment 
could lead to real gains even with a government the United States had other problems 
with. 
During the conversation, Nixon engaged with specific policy issues listed in the 
report or otherwise on his mind. Foreign aid, in his view, was “finished” unless 
“drastically reshaped.” It was therefore important to look at Rockefeller’s 
recommendations on foreign aid “carefully.” Meyer then called the current foreign aid 
program “an export promotion program rather than development assistance.” Nixon 
agreed with his assessment and told him to “say that,” he was willing “to be very liberal 
in aid measures if something new is proposed.” The participants also discussed other 
recommendations in the report including several new regional institutes, and a 
recommendation to form a joint Congressional Committee on the Western Hemisphere.  
The conversation then turned toward two specific countries, Panama and Cuba. 
Rockefeller brought up the issue of Panama, presumably to finish discussing the issue of 
Panama’s leader General Torrijos that he had likely brought up in their previous meeting. 
He had developed a fondness for the General, and felt his was a government the U.S. 
could work with. The U.S. government in particular was interested in signing a new 
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treaty to determine the long-term fate of the Panama Canal. Rockefeller felt the U.S. 
could work with Torrijos, while Meyer brought up the State Department’s concern with 
negotiating with an unconstitutional government. Nixon took Rockefeller’s position on 
this, and as a show of goodwill, told the state department to “get out of the mill” two 
helicopters Torrijos wanted. Nixon had one final point. Contrary to feeling elsewhere in 
the bureaucracy, “He wanted to follow a very tough line of Cuba.” He could possibly 
work with Cuba on issues such as “hijacking matters,” but otherwise he wanted a “tough 
line,” and did not “want to hear press speculation that we are considering a new policy.” 
Nixon stuck to his principles and maintained a tough policy of sanctions against the 
Castro regime. 
The President also engaged with the principal critique of Goodell’s article, the 
failure to publicly release the Rockefeller Report. Nixon’s concerns revolved around 
perception. He did not want the report’s recommendations, and the eventual policy 
direction the White House took to become a matter of “historic record.” He did plan, 
however, to release portions of the report once he made the final policy determinations. 
Until then, he wanted a “disciplined” and “positive” response emphasizing the report’s 
contribution to policy, and not the report itself. Nixon eventually agreed to release the 
report in full as a statement emphasizing the importance of Latin American policy. It 
turned out, however, that his initial inclination was correct. The differences between the 
report and the ultimate tenor of U.S. policy became a tool to bludgeon his approach 
toward the region. Nixon, however, ultimately released the report after determining the 
report’s release would maintain interest in U.S.-Latin American policy after his speech. 
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The report played a major role in the ultimate formulation of U.S. policy toward 
Latin America in Nixon’s speech on October31. While problematic, Rockefeller’s trip 
and report provided ideas for the bureaucracy to ponder over the next month as the NSC 
drafted Nixon’s speech. Many of Rockefeller’s ideas originated with his experience under 
Roosevelt. Some of his ideas, such as better relations with military dictators, came 
directly from the Good Neighbor Policy. Others probably came from speaking with Latin 
American leaders who trusted him due to his experience under FDR. Nixon soon 
incorporated many of Rockefeller’s suggestions into a major policy address. Until then, 
the administration still had the pesky issue of Operation Intercept hanging over its head. 
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Chapter 3-- Operation Intercept End Game 
As Operation Intercept continued, some opposition began to surface within the 
White House. In a strongly critical reprisal of the original plan for Operation Intercept, 
the White House Budget Bureau laid out an argument for its inherent weaknesses, calling 
the plan “grossly inadequate” and “likely to result in embarrassment to the president.” 
According to the Budget Bureau report, Operation Intercept underestimated the damage 
to U.S.-Mexican relations, the political backlash of border community residents, and the 
long-term monetary cost.101 The misgivings of the Budget Bureau added to critical voices 
within the State Department. 
The Mexican government soon noticed the lack of U.S. governmental unity in the 
planning and execution of Operation Intercept. On September 26, U.S. Secretary of State, 
William Rogers, and Mexico’s Foreign Secretary, Carrillo Flores, met in New York City 
where the topic of the interdiction effort arose. During their meeting, Rodgers insisted 
that Operation Intercept was “initiated on the orders of some Assistant Secretary within 
the Department of the Treasury,” and launched with no consultations with the State 
Department.102As Intercept continued, Mexico increased its efforts to end the operation 
diplomatically. On September 29, the Mexican ambassador spoke to Assistant Secretary 
of State Meyer and other U.S. diplomats to deliver another official protest from Mexico. 
According to summary of conversation from Mexico’s Foreign Ministry, the Mexican 
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Ambassador’s position was quite clear. In terms of stopping the marijuana trade, the 
operation was a “failure.” However, the operation was “an excellent instrument to destroy 
the environment of goodwill prevalent along the border.” By the end of the meeting, the 
Mexican entourage had come to two sobering conclusions. First, the United States 
“seemed inclined to maintain ‘Operation Intercept’” since the U.S. delegation seemed 
“uniformed and very distant from the border.” Second, Secretary Rogers was either “not 
informed” about the operation or “lied” to Foreign Minister Flores. If he had not been 
informed, the diplomats reasoned, “that would demonstrate an absolute lack of 
organization within the State Department, and irresponsibility (on the part of Rogers) of 
leaving such an important decision in the hand of a subordinate.”103 
The day after the meeting between Meyer and Mexican diplomats in Washington 
D.C, Díaz Ordaz remarked that a “somber curtain” 104 had fallen between the two 
countries while toasting American astronauts who had recently returned from landing on 
the moon.105 The Mexican president’s remarks made front-page news in Mexico City. 
The coverage in the Mexican press emphasized another point he had made in his toast 
when he referred to the operation as a “bureaucratic error.” He continued saying he did 
not want to “cast a shadow over” what should be a joyous celebration, but his obligation 
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to his people was to make this “misunderstanding go away as soon as possible.”106 His 
foreign minister continued fighting to end the operation by circumventing normal 
diplomatic channels. 
Foreign Minister Flores, possibly after learning about the internal divisions in the 
State Department over Operation Intercept, broke diplomatic protocol and wrote directly 
to Nixon. In the letter, which he wrote by hand and sent straight to the White House, he 
asked President Nixon “to review that operation and to order its excesses be corrected.” 
He additionally noted how terrible the optics of this operation were since the Mexican 
people “simply cannot understand that two weeks after you met with our President, the 
most drastic, and for many, unfriendly measure against Mexico was taken.” He ended by 
writing how it was “totally unorthodox to address you (President Nixon). I will never do 
it again. But in this case I am convinced you have the opportunity of doing something for 
which all Mexicans will be grateful.”107 Foreign Secretary Flores continued negotiating 
once he returned to Mexico. 
 After he delivered his letter and flew back to Mexico, Flores found the situation 
much worse than what he had gathered from New York. In a meeting with Ambassador 
McBride on October 2, 1969, Flores remarked that Operation Intercept was the worst 
problem to materialize in U.S.-Mexican relations in his eleven years of public service. In 
order to solve the problem he suggested skipping the gesture proposed by the Nixon 
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administration to send a delegation to Mexico City, and instead meet in New York City. 
The recommendation to have the talks in New York City was mainly a practical one. 
Díaz Ordaz and Flores felt that the U.S. delegation would be “attacked” in the press and 
“hounded” by reporters. Concerning the start date of the negotiations, the Mexican 
government wanted to begin as soon as possible with an announcement on Friday 
October 3, 1969, with actual talks beginning on Monday October 6. Ambassador 
McBride agreed and recommended the proposed timeline to the State Department.108 
Talks would start one day after the proposed timeline on October 7. 
Even as negotiations were ongoing, the operation showed no signs of slowing 
down. While U.S. officials touted the doubling of marijuana prices as a success, these 
same officials also admitted to major weaknesses in the execution of the operation. In 
addition to smugglers avoiding checkpoints on land, obsolete radar technology meant that 
drug dealers were still able to traffic drugs into the U.S. via air corridors. Despite the 
limited effectiveness of the operation, U.S. customs officials vowed to continue their 
efforts, and even planned an intensification of the operation.109 
 While the negotiation between Mexico and the United States were ongoing, 
Kissinger became more directly involved. While briefed on the situation, Kissinger did 
not take a direct role in Operation Intercept until he drafted the response to Secretary 
                                                 
108 Telegram 5388 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State 02October, 1969, FRUS, 
1969-1972, Volume E-10: Documents on American Republics (Washington, DC: Department of State), 
available online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d442, last accessed on 
April 21, 2014. 
99 Felix Belair Jr “Operation Intercept: Success on Land, Futility in the Air,” New York Times, October 2, 
1969. 
 44 
Flores’s letter. Kissinger may have become involved due to Flores’s letter bypassing the 
State Department and landing on his desk. Kissinger’s memorandum to President Nixon 
focused on the “unorthodox nature of such a letter,” noting that the “unusual step does, in 
fact, underline the intensity of the Mexican feeling about Operation Intercept.” Kissinger 
also reminded the president about Ordaz’s “somber curtain” remark during the toast to 
the U.S. astronauts. Kissinger believed that the Mexican government was worried about a 
“cooling off” by the United States to Mexico, and felt that Operation Intercept was 
“becoming a serious problem in our relations with Mexico.” He concluded his 
memorandum by informing the president that the State Department had agreed to a 
bilateral meeting, and recommended that the President sign a “warmer” response to the 
Foreign Minister than protocol would normally dictate.110 On October 7, the same day as 
the bilateral meeting between the United States and Mexico, Nixon signed the “warm” 
letter to Foreign Minister Flores. He also sent a note to his aid, John Ehrlichman, asking 
for a status update. He ended his request for information by dictating, “this is the time to 
negotiate since we have proved our point pretty effectively.”111 The strong reaction of 
Mexico, as suggested by Flores’ letter, prompted Nixon’s reaction. Nixon, as he often 
would when engaging with foreign leaders and dignitaries, would change his position 
112Operation Intercept would soon be over. 
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 On October 10, 1969, Operation Intercept officially ended earlier than the month 
originally envisioned by the plan’s architects. The plan ended with assurances by the 
Mexican government that it would improve drug enforcement on its side of the border 
with assistance from the United States dubbed “Operation Cooperate.” The result of 
Operation Intercept was the arrest of forty-four low-level smugglers, or one smuggler per 
one hundred thousand people searched, and the mass disruption of commerce along the 
U.S.-Mexican border. While the protests and inconveniences were by no means small on 
the U.S. side of the border, they were larger on the Mexican side of the border.  
Another front-page announcement in the Mexican press heralded the end of 
Operation Intercept and the beginning of Operation Cooperate. The two parties would 
negotiate the details of Operation Cooperate over the next several months in a series of 
bilateral meetings.113 The details, which included monetary assistance from the United 
States, were less important than the realization that respect for Mexican sovereignty 
ensured greater cooperation. Both the United States and Mexico would soon be touting 
the program. Mexico’s running tally of destroyed marijuana plants and poppy fields, 
reminiscent of Vietnam body counts, would be the measure of success. 114 Soon the hard 
work of rebuilding trust and diplomatic relations between the two countries would begin.  
 On November 18, 1969, President Nixon sent a highly apologetic letter to Díaz 
Ordaz. In the letter, Nixon highlighted several Mexican priorities on which his 
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administration had made progress. The most important part of the letter, however, 
reflected his regret about the damage Operation Intercept caused to the bilateral 
relationship: 
In this connection, Mr. President, I want to express my personal regret for the 
friction which Operation Intercept has caused in the relations between our two 
countries. Operation Intercept was conceived as one element in a major campaign 
to combat the traffic in narcotics from whatever source. It was not intended to 
single out Mexico, nor to give offense to Mexico. I want to give you my personal 
assurances on this point. When it became apparent to me that this operation was 
being viewed by your Government as an affront to the Mexican people, and that it 
was causing economic hardship for border communities, I asked that the intensity 
of inspection be reduced to a point where the major frictions, and irritations which 
the operation had caused in our relations with Mexico could be eliminated.115 
 
It would take more than one letter however, to repair the relationship between the two 
countries. 
While Nixon’s team poorly timed and conceived Operation Intercept, its 
termination came at an opportune time for Nixon’s hemispheric policy. Nixon and his 
team would spend the rest of October preparing and writing his one and only large-scale 
speech on Latin American policy. The speech would chart a new course of intra-
hemispheric affairs basing many of its talking points and concepts on the Rockefeller 
Report.  
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Chapter 4—Major Policy Address 
The idea for a major speech on Latin American policy came from Secretary of 
State William Rogers in a July 9, 1969 NSC meeting on Latin America. The Nixon 
administration had yet to make any major substantive policy changes on Latin America, 
and was receiving criticism from Latin American diplomats and the press. Kissinger 
concurred with Rogers and suggested early October as a possible date for the speech. 
Nixon agreed, but remarked that he would emphasize “realism,” and not “generalities or 
platitudes.”116 The president ultimately gave his speech on October 31, 1969, to a 
receptive audience, the Inter-American Press Club, a group he had addressed previously 
as Vice-President. The speech would be the first major policy address he would give on 
Latin America during his time in office. As it turned out, it would also be his last. 
The likely reason for the change in dates from early to late October was to give 
the government a chance to staff and approve the recommendations from the Rockefeller 
Report for their inclusion in the speech. Kissinger’s guidance on this point was clear: 
“there would be no specific decisions on the policy issues before Rockefeller’s views 
were submitted.”117 Once he submitted his report, the bureaucracy would have about six 
weeks to make its objections clear to the president and present its own ideas. Nixon’s 
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cabinet would express its thoughts during the next NSC meeting on Latin America on 
October 15, 1969.  
The day before the NSC meeting, Kissinger talked with Under Secretary of State 
Elliot Richardson to discuss his plan for the next day. As was often the case when Latin 
America was the main issue, Kissinger planned on speaking only in generalities while 
someone else, in this case Richardson, spoke to the more technical details. Kissinger 
advised Richardson to be careful about how he brought up the speech since “the President 
is sensitive about speeches. The President looks at a speech as a way of making the 
bureaucracy do something he thinks it should.”118 During the NSC meeting, the president 
verbally expressed his frustrations with the bureaucracy that would implement his policy, 
continually prodding it to take “risks” in Latin American policy. 
First on the agenda for the NSC were trade preferences and tariffs. Nixon was 
highly skeptical of the recommendations, which the Cabinet offered with several 
exceptions and caveats. Nixon emphasized that he was willing to “take political risks,” 
and all recommendations should “zero in on Latin America.” What Nixon wanted was a 
system of generalized tariffs to help the developing countries of Latin America. 
Generalized tariffs would allow the United States to lower tariffs on developing countries 
while maintaining higher tariffs on more advanced economies. Secretary of State Rogers 
would dampen Nixon’s enthusiasm somewhat by warning about “empty gestures” in the 
upcoming speech. He was worried about overpromising and under delivering. However, 
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when the agenda turned to moving more funds through multilateral organizations, Nixon 
was much more skeptical, “It would be money down a rat hole.”119  
The discussion then turned to some of Rockefeller’s recommendations. For 
example, Nixon brought up the issue of integrating Canada more deeply into the 
hemisphere. In response, Rogers stated, “The Canadians are thinking of joining the 
OAS,” to which Nixon responded, “do it.” While the conversation on the subject became 
a bit glib—for example Nixon wanted to, “Bring Trudeau (prime minister of Candida) in. 
Give him a beard, and let him play with Castro”— the integration of Canada into the 
hemisphere was one of Rockefeller’s recommendations that Nixon had accepted. The 
participants of the meeting favorably received several other of Rockefeller’s 
recommendation such as the untying of AID loans and grants that would allow the use of 
AID funds on local manufactured products, as opposed to the previous rule of requiring 
U.S. goods.  
One recommendation that Nixon could not support was a blanket debt 
rescheduling policy. The Rockefeller Report noted that many countries were “having to 
make new loans,” in order to, “pay interest and amortization on old loans,” and this 
situation should be a “major concern” to the United States.120 The Treasury Department 
was adamant that it did not “want it (debt rescheduling) in the speech.” Nixon, aware that 
he was already asking the U.S. government to move outside of its comfort zone, 
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responded, “I even understand we can’t cover it in the speech.” Nixon, however, felt the 
need to give Rockefeller a heads up of his decision stating, “I do not want to give the 
impression we ignored the Rockefeller report. Go the Rockefeller people and explain it 
must be done country by country.” 
Finally, the meeting ended on a long discussion of the role of the military in the 
region. Nixon likely had the late 1968 coup in Peru when General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
took power on his mind when he observed, “Coups have brought to power Nasser types. 
They don’t come from the elites. They are nationalistic, revolutionary, and anti-
American.” Nixon was likely referring to new military leaders in Peru and Paraguay. The 
new type of military strongmen were not communist but were willing to accept Soviet aid 
and support. Nixon expressed somewhat mixed feelings about military governments. On 
one hand, he thought that the U.S. government should attempt to “lower our profile.” On 
the other hand, he mentioned, “we must influence their leadership through close contact 
between our military and theirs. We should do it but not appear to be doing it.” On how 
the U.S. government should respond to Latin American governments, Nixon came up 
with a three-part test:  “their attitudes toward us, their chances to survive and the degree 
of stability.” Not included in his test was whether a country was democratic calling it, 
“knee-jerk reaction that a democratic government in Chile is more to be admired than 
another.” Nixon’s final notable comment foreshadowed some of the significant military 
coups during his tenure:  “Don’t cut off contact between our military and theirs. They 
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may run the place someday.”121 Once the meeting concluded, the next step was preparing 
the bureaucracy to initiate any changes Nixon wanted to announce in the speech. 
The first action was the untying of U.S. aid ordered as National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 28. The NSDM, published five days after the NSC meeting on 
October 20, was the official presidential order to change policy. Nixon had fought off a 
challenge from AID that recommend the untying be limited to the acquisition of the 
minimum amount of local currencies needed for development programs in the region.122 
The quick turnaround between the NSDM and the NSC meeting was necessary since 
Nixon wanted something concrete he could point to in his speech. He would attempt to 
build up expectations of his foreign policy address over the next ten days. 
In a conversation with Kissinger, Nixon seemed very enthusiastic about the 
speech. He felt that the elites of Latin America would feel that the speech “was the most 
meaningful one that they have heard in years.” The speech in his words had “no new 
promises, only new action.” Nixon wanted to “build up” the speech and asked Kissinger 
to see if “Rocky” (Nelson Rockefeller) would be “willing to come down and background 
the press.” Nixon, somewhat uncharacteristically also said, “it wouldn’t matter if it 
leaked.” He also asked Kissinger to work with H.R Haldeman to build up the speech and 
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“get leaks out.”123 Additionally, in a separate conversation the same night, Nixon wanted 
the speech sent to every Latin American ambassador. Once again, he emphasized, “we 
don’t give a damn if it leaks.”124 Around the same time Nixon was providing his 
guidance, drafts of the speech bounced within the government as each Cabinet level 
department received a chance to provide their input. 
One early cause of concern among some of the government officials was 
Rockefeller’s recommended organizational changes within the State Department and 
NSC to streamline Latin American policy. Rogers did not agree with the recommended 
restructuring, but felt if the president was going to with them then, “he shouldn’t just take 
1/3 of the recommendations but do it all the way through.” Even with his halfhearted 
recommendation, the Secretary of State felt that there was no “chance in the world that 
Congress would pass this anyway.”125 Nixon, when commenting on early versions of the 
speech, seemed generally pleased with the way it was shaping up. He, however, still felt 
that the speech failed to “emphasize strongly enough that the time for slogans and 
promises has ended and the time for action has come.”126 As the date for the speech drew 
closer, the State Department began to have more serious reservations. 
Rogers made one last effort to influence the speech and overall Latin American 
policy with the help of Kissinger. Rogers wanted to change the title of person in charge 
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of Western Hemispheric affairs from Under Secretary to Deputy Secretary moving the 
person farther down the chain of command. Kissinger stated, “that was tried,” but “the 
President didn’t want it that way.” Kissinger then later asked Rogers for his opinion on 
whether Rockefeller should be a part of the press background briefing. The Secretary of 
State answered in the negative and Kissinger appeared to agree with him.127 Rockefeller 
ended up not providing background information to the press, therefore depriving the 
president of his most visible ally in advocating for a new hemispheric policy. In a 
subsequent conversation, Rogers seem exasperated about the speech saying he “didn’t 
understand what the President is doing”. Kissinger attempted to reassure Rogers that the 
president was only trying “to be as close to the Rockefeller recommendation as possible,” 
however, he offered to “hold” the implementing memo on certain technical issues in 
order to allows Rogers to raise his concerns. 
 On another matter, both Kissinger and Rogers were constraining the president’s 
proposed course of action. Rogers, “didn’t agree with putting the Canadians” in the same 
portfolio as the rest of the Caribbean and Latin America as Rockefeller and Nixon 
wanted. Kissinger promised to “send out a rephrasing,” which would make the issue of 
Canada “subject to study,” since he validly noted, “This is not something we want to do 
without talking to the Canadians.”128 While Kissinger’s reasoning may have been sound, 
the Canadian issue provides another vignette were the bureaucracy fought against 
changes Nixon wanted to implement. 
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The day before the speech, personal in the State Department to the president’s 
annoyance were still making changes to the speech highlighting what Kissinger noted 
were there “kamikaze impulse.” Charles Meyer seemed to understand Kissinger’s 
concern, but felt the last minute changes were necessary since “some nuances…had to be 
cleared up.” In Meyer’s opinion, “the speech was pretty damned good—it will sound like 
a full symphony in Spanish.” Continuing rather boldly he felt, “It would be well received; 
in fact, they will think they wrote it.” The two men also discussed the next day’s press 
background briefing. The National Security Advisor admitted again, “he doesn’t really 
know the Latin American issues very well,” even after close to a year on the job and 
offered to brief the “conceptual” portion of the backgrounder while Meyer’s “would 
present the operational part.” 
On the day of the speech, October 31, 1969, at 3:30 PM, Kissinger and Meyer 
provided the press with a background not for attribution briefing prior to the president’s 
speech that night. Meyer had just arrived from a short meeting in the Roosevelt Room in 
the Whitehouse were the president had briefed several key congressional leaders on his 
speech including Senator’s J.W Fulbright and Frank Church.129 While Meyer spoke 
extensively, Kissinger made the most interesting and provocative comments. Kissinger 
began as he previously discussed with the conceptual underpinnings of the speech in 
slightly grandiose language. Latin American policy was an, “extremely important aspect 
of overall American foreign policy,” Kissinger said.  
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Additionally he continued: 
There is a special relationship in the Western Hemisphere. It is the most 
consistent expression of American foreign policy. It is the area with which we are 
geographically closely linked. It is an area which is also of profound 
significance…130 
 
Further explaining the government’s approach, Kissinger nested Latin America in 
Nixon’s larger foreign policy vision as “reflected in the President’s Guam statement,” 
and “the general policy statement announced on his Asian trip.”131 Kissinger was 
referring to one line in the President’s Guam remarks, “I want to be sure that our policies 
in the future, all over the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the rest, reduce 
American involvement. One of assistance, yes, assistance in helping them solve their own 
problems, but not going in and just doing the job ourselves…”132 While Vietnam 
remained the “immediate preoccupation,” Kissinger hoped that the administration was 
remembered for building “a structure of peace,” which he then continued, “what we are 
trying to do in the Western Hemisphere is the first step in this direction.”133  
 Nixon’s speech later that night marked the first time a presidential speech was 
beamed live via satellite to Latin America courtesy of the United States Information 
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Agency.134 Nixon began the speech by downplaying the influence the United States could 
have in changing the region. “For years” he remarked, “we in the United States have 
pursued the illusion that we alone could remake continents.” After citing “the dramatic 
success of the Marshall Plan of postwar Europe,” he ended on a sobering note 
“experience has taught us better.” Nixon hoped to move to a “mature partnership” and 
“toward a more balanced relationship” in the region.135 He then proceeded to list five 
influences that shaped his thinking about hemispheric policy. 
 First, was his personal experience of having “visited every nation in this 
hemisphere.” Second were the recommendations of Governor Rockefeller, which he 
called “farsighted.” Third were the proposals in the Consensus of Viña del Mar. The final 
two factors were the advice of other government officials, and what Nixon called “the 
concern of the people of the United States.” After laying out how his thinking had 
evolved, he continued with one of the many applause lines: “Tonight I offer no grandiose 
promises and no panaceas. I do offer action.”136 The “action” that Nixon referenced was 
generally modest in scope, but realistically achievable during the course of his 
administration. 
He introduced his plans with another applause line certainly appreciated by Latin 
America leaders, “Our partnership should be one in which the United States lectures less 
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and listens more.” His first proposal was to move foreign aid to a multilateral system 
under a new agency were the countries of the region had more input into where the 
United States would channel foreign aid. Trade would also be a priority with the United 
States “lead(ing) a vigorous effort to reduce the nontariff barriers.” Nixon also noted 
growing regional trade integration in the region such as the Central American Common 
Market (CACM). In sticking to a lower key approach he said, “The decisions on how far 
and how fast this process of integration goes, of course, are not ours to make,” while still 
offering assistance if requested. He also introduced his reorganization plan “raising the 
rank of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Under Secretary--
thus giving the hemisphere special representation.” Nixon in the speech also announced 
the untying of AID funds from NSDM 28. Recognizing many of the constraints on his 
policy in announcing the untying of funds, Nixon went off script saying there were “not 
too many occasions when the President can accomplish something by just ordering it to 
be done.”137 Finally, the president announced several other smaller initiatives including 
increased sharing of science and technology. Nixon would end his speech by linking the 
region to his greater goals. 
Nixon’s speech finished on a topic he often brought up, peace. As Kissinger 
stated in the background briefing, the Western Hemisphere could serve as the model for 
building a more peaceful world. Nixon in the speech reinforced Kissinger’s point. After 
saying “we can have lasting peace and progress only if the nations directly concerned 
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take the lead themselves in achieving it.” He offered a “successfully progressing Western 
Hemisphere” could be “an example for the world.” He then continued, “Understandably, 
perhaps, a feeling has arisen in many Latin American countries that the United States 
really ‘no longer cares.’ Well, my answer to that tonight is very simple. We do care. I 
care.”138 In a speech filled with somewhat modest proposals, Nixon would finish by 
setting a rather high visionary bar. His vision never reached the level of Rockefeller’s 
Good Neighbor policy or even the much-maligned Alliance for Progress. 
In a major policy speech, it can be difficult to tease out the different competing 
voices within the text. In the case of this speech, the availability of Nixon’s final draft 
with his personal corrections highlights several points of emphasis. At one point, Nixon 
expressed a “preference” for democracy, but also offered to “deal realistically with 
governments in the inter-American system as they are.” Nixon personally wrote the 
evenhanded verbiage, however, the day before the speech instead of expressing 
“preference” for democracies, he actually “favor(ed) dictatorships.”139 Another change to 
the speech made by Nixon included the removal of a section establishing a Latin America 
advisor in the NSC,140 likely at the behest of Kissinger. The most interesting editorial 
choice was the removal of another section of the speech. While the speech espoused U.S. 
humility and Latin American partnership, Nixon was not prepared to say the following, 
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“We have learned that we lack the power to remake the world in our image; and if the 
principle of non-intervention has meaning, we must also accept the fact that we lack the 
right to do so.”141 Nixon’s inability or unwillingness to accept that the United States did 
not have a right to intervene unilaterally in the hemisphere would haunt him later in his 
term. 
The reaction to the president’s speech among his critics in the domestic press was 
generally poor.142  The response in Latin America, however, as documented by the White 
House, was more positive. A summary of newspaper reports and the private opinions of 
U.S. ambassadors and embassy personal found the reaction to the speech to be “generally 
quite favorable.” The praise tended to focus on the tone of the speech, trade measures, 
and “emphasis on the US talking less but listening more.” Criticism tended to focus on 
the need for more specifics, social development, and lack of endorsement of 
democracy.143 Further reports continued to emphasize the generally positive reaction to 
the president’s address. In Mexico, an estimated four million people tuned in to watch a 
voiced-over Spanish version of the speech translated without commentary. In the 
Mexican press, Excelsior credited Nixon with a “brilliant speech” and a “profound 
understanding of Latin American conditions.” The newspaper continued hoping that his 
speech would not be “obscured by Congress.” The news in Brazil followed a similar 
trajectory. A former government official Roberto Campos called the reduction in trade 
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barriers and untying of U.S. loans and AID funds “a noble proposal,” while also 
commenting that in the United States, “Congress has the last word.” Unsurprisingly the 
most critical reaction to the speech came from Cuba with one radio broadcast calling the 
speech “pompous” and full of “hypocritical breast-beating.”144 While the White House 
undoubtedly reveled in the generally positive coverage, the administration needed to 
build momentum for change.  
Nixon continued to sell his vision by releasing the Rockefeller Report in full ten 
days after the speech. The press widely praised the administration’s move. The 
Washington Post led with the headline “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For.” They 
praised the report, calling many of Rockefeller’s proposals “excellent.” The editors also 
correctly highlighted the strong signal the release of the report sent, “Mr. Nixon in effect 
applies a blowtorch at his own back; he builds into the Latin-policymaking process a 
strong outside impetus for change.”145 Another newspaper, The New York Times, also 
praised the report calling the recommendations “ground-breaking.” Continuing, the 
newspaper reported that Nixon’s speech, while lacking the Rockefeller Report’s “sense of 
urgency,” realistically “espoused the report’s philosophy of a new partnership.”146 The 
positive press would be useful in the short term as the Senate began oversight hearings. 
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Over the longer term, however, Nixon’s “blowtorch” would backfire when it came time 
to implement many of the proposals from the Rockefeller Report and his speech. 
Rockefeller continued to advocate for the president and his policy proposals 
before a skeptical U.S. Senate Subcommittee hearing on November 20, 1969. Rockefeller 
took particular criticism from Senator Church on his view that the United States must 
continue providing military aid to Latin American countries. Rockefeller strongly felt that 
many countries in the region, citing Uruguay as an example, would “face chaos and 
anarchy” without U.S. assistance. Rockefeller additionally faced criticism for not making 
stronger recommendations on birth control,147 to which he responded that any imposed 
solution would be “resented and perhaps counter-productive.” The governor managed to 
find support on the Senate panel for other portions of his recommendations including the 
organizational change in the State Department, increased trade, and debt renegotiation.148 
While the Senate was skeptical of some changes, and supportive of others, overall, the 
president had begun to build some shortly lived momentum in implementing his Latin 
American policy vision. 
By the end of the year, according to one news account, the Nixon administration, 
speaking on background, was generally disappointed in its foreign policy achievements. 
Among the “disappointments” were lack of progress in negotiating an end to the Vietnam 
War, Nigerian Civil War, and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Among his accomplishments 
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including troop withdrawals from Vietnam, the unnamed White House official touted 
“new policies toward Asia and Latin America—outlined respectively at Guam last 
summer and in a speech later here” as potential positive developments in the 
administration.149 Nixon would continue to focus on Latin America as the year wound 
down. 
December 30, 1969, Kissinger issued a memorandum outlining the president’s 
position on future U.S.-Latin American negotiations to implement the points of his 
speech. Kissinger relayed the president’s specific instructions to “present specific and 
concrete proposals.” The president wanted the proposals of the U.S. government to be 
“imaginative and positive,” while maintaining a “style of partnership and dialogue.” He 
also relayed a large list of specific initiative the president wanted to work on including 
the removal of “nuisance duties,” generalized trade preferences, multilateral aid 
frameworks, and debt services.150 The memorandum appears to demonstrate a sincere 
effort by Nixon to engage and improve the U.S. relationship with the region. The year 
therefore ended with Nixon and his team attempting to implement in good faith the 
guidance of his speech. Unfortunately beginning in 1970 Nixon’s nascent Latin American 
policy would implode due to a variety of internal and external factors. 
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Conclusion 
“On many occasion a report is made advocating a program for progress in Latin 
America; everybody gets excited for a few days or a few weeks; and then the report 
is quietly pigeon –holed and for the most parts forgotten. United States policy 
toward Latin America must have consistency, continuity, and follow-through. ” 
-Richard Nixon 1955 
 
 Kissinger, a known soccer enthusiast, was in Mexico City in early June 1970 to 
watch the final matches of the World Cup. The day before the title match, Kissinger took 
a moment out of his schedule to call on Díaz Ordaz as a courtesy to the Mexican 
president. According to the State Department summary of the meeting, Díaz Ordaz 
brought up the issue of Operation Intercept. He regretted his harsh public comments, “but 
said he had been placed in impossible position. Half of Mexicans thought, he said, that he 
had combined with President Nixon to deceive Mexican people about the operation and 
the other half thought he had been deceived by our president in not telling him about 
‘intercept.’” Díaz Ordaz then mentioned that he thought the United States had taken 
“prompt and effective” steps to ameliorate the damage, and that the relationship was now 
back on an “even keel.” Henry Kissinger assured the president that the United States now 
had certain vague “precautions” in place to prevent another Operation Intercept from 
happening again. Kissinger then remarked that the relationship between the United States 
and Mexico was important due not only to the common frontier, but also to Mexico’s 
position as “the border between the English and Spanish-speaking worlds of America.”151  
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 Operation Intercept had no corollary in the Roosevelt administration. However, 
the United States and Mexico had several tense diplomatic moments during FDR’s terms 
in office. One of the better-known moments was Mexico’s expropriation of oil fields in 
1938. Before the expropriation of the oil fields, Mexico seized large tracts of U.S. 
corporate owned farmland in an effort to promote agricultural reform. The response of 
Mexico’s leadership in both Operation Intercept and what one historian coined as the 
agrarian dispute were similar. For example, in both cases Mexican diplomats 
circumvented the State Department and appealed to the president. In the case of 
Operation Intercept, it came through a letter, while in the case of the agrarian dispute it 
came from direct appeals from the ambassador Josephus Daniels to FDR, a personal 
acquaintance of the president. Similarly, after both crisis passed, Mexico negotiated 
monetary aid from the United States white continuing its preferred policy. Mexico 
continued with land reform in the 1930s providing compensation to U.S. companies with 
aid provided by the U.S. government. Mexico in the 1970s continued their previous 
policies of burning marijuana fields, only this time with U.S. subsidies. 152 
While the U.S. government and Mexico were able to mitigate the damage of 
Operation Intercept, Nixon’s greater Latin American policy as outlined in his October 31 
speech floundered. Kissinger later wrote in his memoir that vision Nixon had laid out in 
his speech “was an idea ahead of its time.” Nixon in his speech spoke eloquently of 
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greater “partnership,” increased hemispheric trade, and more effective foreign aid. Not 
mentioned in the speech, but championed by Nixon, the integration of Canada into the 
hemisphere began under Nixon with Canada becoming a permanent observer to the OAS 
in 1972, before becoming a permanent member in 1990. Besides the integration of 
Canada, Nixon pushed for greater integration of South America into the hemisphere. The 
key symbol of integration would be the improvement and completion of the Pan-
American Highway. Nixon’s vision was simple “a road usable year round —from NY to 
the tip of S.A. [South America].”153 Unlike other Latin American priorities, Nixon spent 
a considerable amount of energy and appropriations on the issue. Successfully 
completing the highway, began under FDR, would have been a major accomplishment. 
Ironically, the failure to complete the highway was the direct result of a lawsuit brought 
by the Sierra Club under one of Nixon’s signature domestic achievements, the passage of 
the National Environmental Policy Act.154The failure to implement Nixon’s ideas in 
Kissinger’s estimation were due to bureaucratic divisions, particularly the opposition of 
John Connally, the Secretary of the Treasury, who succeeded in delaying the submission 
of any legislation that would favor Latin America. Additionally, a ten percent reduction 
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in foreign aid, and a ten percent surcharge on imports further damaged relations, and in 
Kissinger’s estimation “put an end to any further multilateral effort in the Western 
Hemisphere for the remainder of Nixon’s first term.”155 Kissinger himself also deserved 
much of the blame for Nixon’s failure. He admitted to having a “distorted geographic 
perspective,” continuing, “London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn seemed close; Mexico City 
seemed far away, Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires beyond reach.”156 According to Nelson 
Rockefeller’s biographer and aide, Rockefeller blamed Nixon for failing to implement his 
recommendations, but also acknowledged, “it was not entirely Nixon’s fault.” He had 
concluded that he had failed to “infect his friend Henry Kissinger with his own passion 
for Latin America.”157 
 Nixon’s framework in many respects resembled the “golden age” of U.S-Latin 
American relations under FDR’s Good Neighbor policy. While Nixon failed to respect 
nonintervention, as demonstrated by CIA machinations in Chile and elsewhere, he also 
never sent in the armed forces as previous and subsequent presidents did. Nixon also kept 
his promise to “deal realistically with governments in the Inter-American system as they 
are.” Even in the case of Chile, the United States maintained diplomatic relations 
throughout. In the case of other dictatorships, particularly Brazil, relations flourished. 
Roosevelt’s form on nonintervention could be equally fuzzy. In August of 1933, Ramón 
Grau San Martín came to power in a military coup. FDR refused to recognize the Cuban 
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government until Colonel Fulgencio Batista overthrew the government in January 1934. 
Batista maintained a strong influence on the new Cuban government, officially led by 
President Carlos Mendicta. The United States recognized the new government within five 
days.158 
 Nixon’s military policies in the region also mirrored Roosevelt’s policies. During 
his second NSC meeting on Latin America, Nixon emphasized that he wanted close 
contact between U.S. and Latin American military officers. Additionally in 1971, he 
disapproved an effort underway in the Department of Defense to shutter Southern 
Command.159 Roosevelt’s military officers also remained engaged in the region. For 
example, in the case of the Dominican Republic, led by the military dictator Trujillo, U.S. 
military officers recommended a much more cooperative policy with the Dominican 
Republic than the State Department.160 Finally, FDR extended full diplomatic courtesies 
and recognition to military dictators. In 1939, FDR personally met with Nicaragua’s 
military leader Anastasio Somoza García receiving him at the train station and allowing 
him to spend the night in the White House.161 Thirty-Two years later Nixon would 
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receive the third Somoza to rule Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, into the White 
House saying, “Mi casa esta(sic) su casa.”162 
 Finally, the direct link between the two presidents’ Latin American policies was 
the advice and counsel of Nelson Rockefeller. His recommendations, such as closer ties 
to military leaders, were in many ways a direct transplant of FDR era ideas. The 
similarities between his ideas in 1969 and the FDR era policies is not surprising. His first 
business trip to Venezuela in 1935, where he fell in love with the people and culture, took 
place during the Good Neighbor policy. Several years later, he came to learn more about 
U.S-Latin American relations in his governmental positions under Roosevelt. Galo Plaza 
may never have recommended Rockefeller except for their encounters under Roosevelt in 
1945 shepherding the passage of the Act of Chapultepec.163 Rockefeller earned the 
credibility he needed during the Good Neighbor policy that allowed him to influence 
policy under Nixon. 
 For all their similarities, Nixon was never able to reboot the Good Neighbor 
policy. The standard explanation for why Nixon’s Latin American policies failed is that 
he prioritized other regions of the world. Perhaps, the lack of prioritization was 
unavoidable. Nixon faced many urgent foreign policy issues vital to the nation’s interest 
in the Soviet Union, China, the Middle East and Vietnam. With so many other important 
issues, and limited time, the minimal engagement with Latin America was perhaps 
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appropriate.164 Other issues, however, also played a role. For example, even though 
FDR’s relations with Congress were strained at times, his relations with the House and 
Senate were also at times very good. Nixon’s relations with Congress on the other hand 
always were strained sometimes causing difficulties in implementing his agenda. One 
other point is that the global position of the United States was very different in the 1930s 
as compared to the late 1960s. FDR led a nation that originally wanted to focus more on 
its core interests in the hemisphere. Nixon led a Cold War United States thoroughly 
entangled in world affairs. 
 The Culture of the United States had also changed over time as best demonstrated 
in the films Americans watched during that era. Movies such as The Emperor Jones 
(1933), Blondies Goes Latin (1942), and Walt Disney’s The Three Caballeros generally 
portrayed residents of Latin America in a positive manner.165 Additionally one opinion 
poll conducted in 1940 indicated that 84% of Americans wanted to know more about 
Latin America, and 75% called for greater contact between the United States and the 
region.166 During Nixon’s presidency, the public knew little about Latin America, and the 
depiction of the region in Hollywood films such as Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, 
Bananas, and Bring me the Head of Alfredo Garcia, depicted the stereotypical Latin 
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American as “inept,” and “blood thirsty.”167 Nixon himself at times seemed resigned to 
the American public’s indifference, once stating: 
We’ve been around this track a number of times. I had the Latin American 
heads of state here. Nobody gives one tinker’s damn about Colombia, 
Venezuela, et cetera. We try! You know, they don’t even care about 
Mexico. Not much. 168 
 
Times had even changed since Nixon’s loss to Kennedy in 1960 where Nixon blamed the 
loss of Cuba to Communism for his electoral defeat.169 
 The situation was different not only in the United States, but also in Latin 
America. The violent student protests that greeted Rockefeller at many of his stops 
emphasized this point. Many people in Latin America were dismissive of his report even 
though as one historian noted, “the report essentially reiterated the nonintervention 
principle of the Good Neighbor policy.” The reason many of the Latin American elites 
were dismissive was in the historian’s opinion, “they no longer believed in the possibility 
of nonintervention.”170 Newer studies of Rockefeller’s trips suggest his reception in Latin 
America was more positive than the newspaper reports suggested.171 However, whatever 
the true feelings of the population, Rockefeller conducted his presidential mission during 
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a time of massive societal turbulence, particularly in the student population.172 Finally, 
Richard Nixon and Franklin D. Roosevelt, irrespective of ideology, each approached the 
presidency in a fundamentally different way. One Nixon aide recounted how Rockefeller 
consistently singled out FDR’s ability to “cultivate a sympathy and understanding, and 
convincing interest, in the hemisphere.”173 Nixon, by choice, lack of ability, or 
circumstances simply could not match FDR’s ability. FDR had an instinctive ability to 
juggle multiple balls and take advice from multiple sources that served him well during 
his presidency. Nixon at times appeared to take advice from different individuals. 
Nixon’s interactions with Rockefeller on Latin American issues was the clearest example, 
but the interactions with Latin American leaders also left an impression, at least 
temporarily.174 For the most part, however, Nixon relied on the advice of Kissinger, who 
once stated if he needed “any information on Latin America, I’ll look it up in an 
Almanac.”175 Kissinger’s version of realpolitik did not have much room for the United 
States’ closest geographic neighbors.  
On the first day of the New Year January 1, 1970, Viron Vaky worried about the 
future of U.S-Latin American relations. He believed that the U.S. government had “and 
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articulated a conceptual framework” that was “realistic and reasonable—even historic. 
But most of our government does not believe or accept it, or does not understand it; and 
we are in danger of betraying it.” Vaky foresaw “stormy times” ahead and the need for 
“special effort, special concern, some policies that are politically difficult domestically, 
and money,” to fulfill the president’s vision for Latin America. Additionally, the “bold 
and imaginative” ideas in the Rockefeller Report would require “commitment of 
substantially increased inputs of resources and efforts.” Kissinger wrote at the top his 
memo “excellent paper,” at the end he wrote, “All right, how do we get it?”176 Looking 
back on the Nixon administration as a whole, Vaky’s worries proved prescient. What was 
now Vaky labeled “historic” was a throwback to a bygone Good Neighbor era. However, 
times had changed, and a policy that may have worked in the 1930s and 1940s would 
face harsher scrutiny in the 1970s. 
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